Journal of World Sociopolitical Studies

Abstract Objective: Barack Obama entered office, promising engagement with Tehran; by the end of his first term, his administration had assembled an exceptionally broad multilateral sanctions regime. This article explains that reversal; it uses the case of Iran’s nuclear program to extend the Copenhagen School's theory of securitization in two ways. First, it treats sanctions and institutional measures not just as consequences of a completed securitization but as part of the securitizing process itself: the UN Security Council Resolution 1929, the IAEA's November 2011 report on possible military dimensions, and the 2012 oil embargo each reset the discursive ground and enabled the next move, so discourse and material action co-produced one another. Second, it theorizes the target state's responses as a structural enabling condition of securitization rather than a factor external to it.
Method: Using explanatory-outcome process tracing, the analysis follows the campaign through four stages - discursive entrapment (2009), institutional coalescence around Resolution 1929 (2010), scientific validation through the November IAEA (2011), and the normalization of sanctions (2012) - and identifies the United States and its allies as the securitizing actors.
Results: Iran's legalism, its missed diplomatic openings, and the timing of its enrichment disclosures emerge as conditions that facilitated the campaign without being its cause.

Abstract Objective: Iran–Russia relations remain contested in Iranian foreign policy, situated between strategic partnership and interest-based cooperation. Although shared concerns over Western pressure and cooperation in regional security, energy, and multilateral institutions have strengthened strategic convergence, persistent differences over issues such as the Caspian Sea, energy competition, the JCPOA, and Russia’s relations with the Persian Gulf states reveal important constraints on bilateral ties. Despite extensive scholarship on Iran–Russia relations, existing studies have predominantly emphasized geopolitical and material factors, while paying comparatively less attention to the role of identity, historical experiences, and policymakers’ perceptions in shaping cooperation and disagreement.
Mehtod: This study addresses this gap by examining Iran–Russia relations through constructivism as its primary theoretical framework, complemented by insights from cognitive diplomacy. Employing a qualitative research design based on documentary analysis and case studies, the study examines the geopolitical-security dimension through the Zangezur Corridor and the economic dimension through energy cooperation.
Results: Findings indicate that, although Iran and Russia have expanded cooperation across several strategic areas, their relationship does not constitute a comprehensive strategic alliance. Rather, it is better understood as interest-based cooperation characterized by selective convergence, pragmatic coordination, and persistent constraints arising from divergent interests, historical experiences, and differing perceptions.

Abstract This article examines the U.S. presidents’ securitization and desecuritization of post-revolutionary Iran. Employing securitization theory as its theoretical framework and qualitative content analysis as its research method, it analyzes 104 paramount instances of U.S. presidential rhetoric including State of the Union addresses, speeches delivered during the United Nations General Assembly's General Debates, and National Security Strategy reports. The analysis shows how successive U.S. presidents have framed Iran as an existential threat across multiple security sectors—military, political, societal, economic, and emerging cybersecurity—to justify their extraordinary policies regarding the country. A key finding of the research is the distinction between U.S. presidents’ securitization of the Iranian state and the Iranian nation, which first emerged during George W. Bush’s first term. Moreover, the study identifies both continuity and change in U.S. securitization and desecuritization of Iran over the past four decades, conceptualizing them into two overarching frameworks: the Realist approach and the Constructivist approach. This research introduces the novel concept of Positive Securitization, or Desecuritizing Securitization, as a new addition to the theoretical framework of securitization theory, and highlights its application during the Obama administration. Positive securitization refers to the use of securitizing discourse to justify the desecuritization of dialogue and political engagement within a specific context. It does so by claiming that even extreme exceptional measures—military or economic—would prove inadequate in addressing a perceived threat, thereby presenting diplomacy as the only viable solution. The article offers a comprehensive exploration that provides a detailed understanding of U.S. presidential rhetoric and the gradual construction of Iran’s image as a threat.

Abstract By the advent of the New Labour government in 1997, under Prime Minister Tony Blair, the UK became actively involved in various international conflicts, including the war in Kosovo (1998), Afghanistan (2001), and Iraq (2003). This article seeks to explore why the New Labour government under Blair engaged in multiple wars and conflicts, often experiencing limited material gains for its efforts. By focusing on social factors such as the desire for recognition and a sense of ontological security, the article hypothesizes that New Labour’s conflictual stance stemmed not solely from material considerations, but significantly from the UK government’s feeling of ontological insecurity within the international society. This article argues that once a state's sense of ontological security is disrupted, whether temporally or spatially, it often pushes states to prioritize reclaiming its lost national identity over safeguarding material gains and interests, aiming to restore its ontological security. Highlighting the determination of elite policymakers to stand closely aligned with the United States, the study will use a content analysis approach to analyze three key conflicts involving the New Labour government. Ultimately, the findings suggest that a profound sense of ontological insecurity played a crucial role in driving the UK government toward conflict-oriented behaviors.

Abstract Over the past century, the United Kingdom has transitioned through various international roles, from a global superpower during its imperial era to a key partner within the European Union. Brexit, however, has triggered what many scholars describe as a foreign policy ‘identity crisis’. This paper challenges this conventional narrative by applying an ontological security framework to investigate how EU membership and the European integration process themselves represented an identity crisis for many Britons. The analysis explores the emotional motives behind Brexit by examining how Euroscepticism, combined with a desire to reclaim Britain’s ‘islandness’ identity, contributed to the decision to leave the European Union. Employing a thematic narrative analysis, the research examines the interaction between identity-based motivations and broader political and historical contexts to reveal new understandings of the multifaceted factors driving Brexit and its enduring effects. By investigating ontological security concepts such as existential threat, continuity disruption, and the restoration of narrative identity, the paper argues that EU integration itself, rather than Brexit, was perceived by many as the principal threat to Britain’s biographical narrative and national identity. These insights contribute to understanding how identity-based anxieties influence major political decisions and carry implications for policymaking and EU–UK relations moving forward.

Abstract Russia’s invasion of Ukraine involved a combination of hard and soft power measures, with geopolitical representations strategically employed to justify violations of international law. Despite their significance for understanding Russia’s regional actions, academic literature has mainly underexplored geopolitical representations. This paper aims to address this gap and answer to the following questions: (1) how did Russia use geopolitical narrations to justify the war against Ukraine, and (2) why did Russian geopolitical representations fail to achieve the aims? The research hypothesis is that 'the purpose of geopolitical narratives of perceived threats from Ukraine was to receive internal support and legitimize the war form the point of view of International Laws'. The research findings suggest that Russia’s initial military intervention was primarily based on a geopolitical narrative portraying Ukraine as an immediate threat through the alleged presence of Nazis, which served as a pretext to justify military action. In reality, this narrative was also used to retain Ukraine as a buffer zone against NATO expansion. This paper examines how geopolitical representations have influenced Russia’s foreign policy and its implications for regional security, and shows how they have been used to justify and sustain Russia’s military actions against Ukraine.

Abstract This study examines Russia’s strategic culture in West Asia and its implications for bilateral relations with Iran from the post-Soviet period (1991) to recent developments in 2025. Employing a qualitative framework rooted in strategic culture analysis, the research demonstrates that Russia’s approach toward Iran is shaped by pragmatic opportunism, historical experience, and a desire to maintain regional influence without overcommitting militarily. Findings reveal that Moscow engages with Tehran episodically, balancing cooperation against shared threats with strategic caution to preserve flexibility in relations with other regional actors, including Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. Brief episodes such as the U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities, the Syrian crisis, and the ongoing war in Ukraine illustrate how Russia mediates, condemns actions diplomatically, and selectively coordinates with Iran without offering binding security guarantees. The study identifies a persistent divergence in perceptions: Russia often views Iran as a secondary, conditional partner, whereas Tehran expects collaboration on an equal footing. Despite these differences, mutual interests in regional stability, energy cooperation, and strategic depth create occasions for tactical alignment, particularly under external pressures. Overall, the results demonstrate that the Russia–Iran relationship is conditional, adaptive, and strategically ambiguous, with cooperation shaped less by ideological convergence and more by pragmatic calculations. By situating these interactions within the framework of strategic culture, the study provides a nuanced understanding of the limits and possibilities of Russia–Iran engagement in West Asia, highlighting how historical legacies, geopolitical constraints, and contemporary crises collectively define a partnership that is influential yet inherently fragile.

Abstract Iran valued and positioned France and its culture inside a conceptual image of its own civilization prior to the Islamic Revolution. Even if France lags behind Iran in solid political connections and contacts, its cultural richness, led to the highest degree of presence in Iranian society and among its intellectuals in the cultural sphere. Such a link was susceptible to a social and political upheaval in Iran, following the country's revolution. This study employs unstructured interviews to examine a representative sample of 19 political, cultural, and academic elites, comprising both pre-revolution Francophones and post-revolution executives, focussing on their perspectives and elite experiences within the historicalcultural context of bilateral relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and France. This research focuses on the question of how the Islamic Revolution and the subsequent establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran faced the continuity and persistence of this historical cultural trend and what relationship it established with it through a distinct process. 

Abstract Recently, the India-Pakistan conflict has escalated after the Pahalgam terrorist attack. The Indo-Pakistani conflict has been one of the longest running issues in International Politics since World War II. The two countries' nuclear weapon tests in
May 1998, as a turning point, have had a profound effect on the conflict. Since then, two views have emerged on the impact of these weapons on the conflict. On the onehand, the followers of the optimistic view have emphasized the stabilizing nature of nuclear weapons, and on the other hand, those who are known for their pessimistic approach have spoken of the possibility of an escalation of the Indo-Pakistani conflict. The purpose of this article is to investigate the consequences, whether positive or negative, of possessing nuclear weapons on India and Pakistan’s bilateral conflict; more precisely, the article focuses on answering the following question: What role have nuclear weapons played in de-escalating the India-Pakistan conflict? An investigation of the events of the last 27 years in India-Pakistan relations,
especially its critical points, reveals that nuclear weapons have had an impact on the New Delhi-Islamabad conflict by deterrence and compellence. Adopting a moderate approach (between optimists and pessimists), an attempt has been made to examine the de-escalation of tensions between India and Pakistan over the past 27 years in the shadow of nuclear weapons.

Abstract Israel’s foreign policy at times diverges from prevailing realist expectations, specifically rational considerations and prudence. This article argues that this is the result of what Ernst Cassirer calls mythical thought or what can be called a myth-based discourse that constructs the mindset of policy makers and has made the emergence of non-realist elements in Israel’s foreign policy possible. In this discourse, quantity, quality, similarity, space, and time acquire specific characteristics and, in the field of foreign policy, this primarily leads to maximalist aspirations, volunteerism, reactiveness, lack of proportionality between capabilities and actions, and at times refraining from diplomatic engagements. However, we encounter a state's identity as a modern ruling state which, to gain international recognition and acceptability, must abide by the norms and laws that define statehood. On the other hand, we face an identity stemming from a mythical discourse, encompassing non-modern, irrational elements and self-definitions based on rules that often contradict legal discourse. Relying on discourse analysis, the texts produced by Israeli foreign policymakers are analyzed to show how this specific way of thinking has made non-realist elements in Israeli foreign policy possible.

Abstract The international order is undergoing profound transformations, ushering in a transitional period marked by instability and redefined power structure. This global transition has created a power vacuum in the Middle East, where regional actors, including Iran, Turkey and Israel, are pursuing unilateral strategies to establish dominance. However, these efforts have intensified rivalries and instability, while events such as the October 7 Hamas attack on Israel, Hezbollah’s involvement in the conflict, escalating tensions in Syria, and the eventual fall of Bashar al-Assad have further exacerbated regional instability. This study explores a pivotal question: What strategy can safeguard Iran’s national interests amidst the dynamic transitions in the international and regional order? The research posits that Iran, as a pivot state, should adopt a paradigm shift to an issue-based foreign policy. This strategic shift enables Iran to move beyond a security-driven, survival-focused paradigm toward becoming a constructive middle power balancer. By prioritizing multilateral cooperation, addressing critical regional issues, and fostering diplomatic engagement, this approach enhances Iran’s ability to manage tensions, strengthen its influence, and promote stability. Ultimately, this redefined role aligns Iran’s national interests with broader regional and global frameworks, ensuring a more resilient and impactful foreign policy stance.

Abstract Constructivism theory believes that the power, security and survival of a nation are often shaped by the identity structures and perceptions of its agents, which in turn define the threats and opportunities that it faces. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia suffered an identity crisis and tried to regain its position as a "great power" by adopting the Eurasian identity model. The background of the research showed that realist, geopolitical and traditional investigations cannot correctly and fully explain the way in which the Eurasian identity was formed and its impact on Russia's military actions in Ukraine. As a result, this study tries to answer the question of how Russian identity and perception-based motivations in Russia's attack on Ukraine can be understood through constructivism theory. The main hypothesis is that constructivism provides insights into the main reasons for Russia's military invasion of Ukraine, which can analyze certain factors in this war, which cannot be understood through traditional theories. The findings of this paper confirm that Russia's attack on Ukraine was aligned with its role as a Eurasian power and Putin's identity visions. This article uses a qualitative research method using field and library sources to analyze the hypothesis.

Abstract Saudi foreign policy was mostly affected by its strategic relations with the United States as its primary and sole security provider. However, since the rise of Mohammed Bin Salman, Saudi Arabia further developed its relations with permanent non-Western members of the United Nations Security Council, respectively China and Russia. This study mainly contends that this transformation took place through strategic hedging, with regional and global consequences. It is contended that Saudi Arabia has adopted a triangular foreign policy through hedging, in order to balance its foreign relations with America and achieve regional supremacy. In this article, through a thematic analysis, we will investigate the ways in which Saudi foreign policy adopted hedging, the reasons for this action, and the motifs behind this decision. Saudi Arabia has tried to pursue national interests through hedging. This attempt is affected by a post-Cold War environment, preparing for a possible multi-polarization of the international system. Saudi Arabia also tries to improve its image alongside this approach in foreign policy. Correspondingly, this diversification of Saudi foreign policy is noticeably compatible with its domestic policy of opening up and adopting rapid modernization, which is analyzed through hedging and Neoclassical Realism.

Abstract In the post-2020 security environment of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, marked by the easing of Iranian-Saudi tensions, intra-Sunni reconciliation, the resolution of the Qatar blockade, and the signing of the Abraham Accords, the European Union (EU) sought to capitalize on the détente to advance its strategic interests. Compared to the other members of the so-called Western camp, the EU, which appears particularly vulnerable to its neighbouring region's instability, responded poorly to the emerging challenges and opportunities. Which factors explain the inefficiency of the EU to benefit from a permissive strategic environment and become more impactful in its broader neighbourhood? This article attempts to promote our understanding of EU’s foreign policy towards the MENA region through a Neoclassical Realist theoretical approach. Structural changes alone cannot explain the EU's failure to have a more prominent role in the region. Intervening variables, such as the role of institutions, state-society relations, and strategic culture, can shed light on the lack of policy cohesiveness and the overall inability of the EU to promote its influence abroad.  

Abstract Considering that the greatest threat to Iran in the past 400 years has emerged from the geography of Iraq (from the time of the Ottoman rule and onwards), it must be noted that Iraq is one of Iran's most important neighbors. Therefore, continuous examination of the shaping factors in Iran-Iraq relations is crucial. Although the history of Iran-Iraq relations spans over a century, this article seeks to explore, utilizing a historical-comparative method and an analytical approach, the shaping factors of Iran-Iraq relations from 2003 to 2022. The argument presented in this article suggests that while Iran managed to expand its regional influence in the aftermath of the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime, and replaced the pattern of hostility and tension of the Ba'athist era with a pattern of interaction and cooperation, the element of cooperation and interaction in Iran-Iraq relations is gradually fading due to changes and developments at domestic, regional and international levels.

Abstract The US foreign policy in the post-World War II has been marked by periods of unilateralism, while in other periods, multilateralism has been more prevailing. The existing works, while explaining certain periods of unilateralism by various domestic and international factors, such as neo-conservative ideology and superpower rivalries in the Cold War, are unable to explain the reason for which in some periods, the US foreign Policy has been more dominant. This article seeks to explain the difference by referring to the conceptual complexity of US presidents. We analyzed the content of news conference transcripts for 11 post-WWII US presidents using the Flesch-Kincaid text readability index to measure presidents’ conceptual complexity. We used the index in our previous study to explain the unorthodoxy of Donald Trump’s foreign policy. Findings suggest with statistical significance that Presidents with low levels of conceptual complexity do not consider many factors as important and prefer unilateral actions by emphasizing short-term achievements. On the contrary, presidents with complex cognition are less likely to believe that the US can solve critical or long-term international issues alone.

Abstract WWII and its consequences served to bring a new era of extensive cooperation between the United Kingdom and the United States, leading to the birth of the Anglo-American special relationship (AASR). However, the two countries’ global widespread interests led to inevitable conflicts of interest, mostly favoring the US. Here, the question arises: Why did postwar Britain maintain its attachment to the AASR in times of conflicting interest with America? The paper, motivated by Gidden’s definition of ontological security, discusses that the consequences of WWII not only generated for the UK physical security concerns, but also ontological insecurity. In this respect, postwar Britain, accepting an inferior role, sought a special relationship with the US to consolidate this mutual partnership in order to mitigate its ontological insecurity in the postwar world order. The paper then, by investigating two cases of British-American conflicting interests in Iran, and raising a material-ideational debate, aims to identify the advantages of ontological security theory in explaining Britain’s “mechanism of tolerance” in preserving the AASR. Otherwise stated, through the proposed conceptual framework, the paper explores the way in which ontological security needs shape the postwar UK’s behaviors to prioritize its close relations with the US, regardless of the costs.

Abstract One of the most critical issues in Iran's foreign policy is European countries' foreign policy toward the Iran-US crisis. The hostage crisis in Tehran on November 4, 1979 (Aban 13, 1358 SH) was the first Iran-US crisis to affect Iran's relations with Western countries. This study aims to investigate the following question: "What were the French policies toward the hostage crisis, and how were they formed?" To answer this question, the “strategic autonomy” framework was utilized to comprehend France's foreign policy. This research employs a "historical case study" methodology, which critically analyzes historical documents, such as press documents, official reactions, and diplomatic documents. The findings of this study indicate that the French foreign policy of this period can be analyzed using the concept of "strategic autonomy." In its relations with Iran, France adopted the policy of "independently regulating relations with a third country," "independence in foreign policy decision-making," and "ensuring the well-being of citizens," whereas in its relations with the US, it followed the policy of non-interference in the US's reciprocal crisis with the third party and maintaining economic interests.

Abstract The post-world war liberal order has been primarily based on the pillars of international institutions inspired from the idea of multilateral agreements and rooted in the ideological components of Western enlightenment and liberal tradition. This orderو which has been established and consolidated by a complex set of regulations in form of international institutions, trade agreementsو and security alliances, continued to function well after the bipolar system of the Cold War, into the hegemonic US-led era. The principal ideology of this hegemony borrows its spirit from an exceptionality of identity, the much discussed, yet disputable concept of American Exceptionalism. By performing a critical discourse analysis on presidential State of the Union addresses post-World War II regarding nuclear institutional hegemony, this research identifies the way in which political identity and ideational elements, derived from the notion of American Exceptionalism, have played a key role in the strategic culture of America, shaping its grand strategies throughout the past decades to create and maintain an institutional hegemonic dominance in the global arena, and in the nuclear regime as a case study. As a result of the theoretical and critical discourse analysis combined, the concept of Institutional Hegemonic Resilience has been offered to explain the dynamics.

Abstract Studies on securitization theory have neglected the fact that securitization is in place only when it is proven that expression of fear is insincere. A number of indicators can be retrieved from the literature on deception detection in social sciences to verify sincerity in fear expressions by political leaders. Application of these indicators in this paper demonstrates that former Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu’s expression of fear from Iran in his speech at the United Nations General Assembly in 2014, was more a case of constructing an existential threat, than expressing genuine apprehensions. A complete examination of Netanyahu’s claims about Iran establishes their contradiction with the known realities. The inconsistency between truth and Netanyahu’s goals, the knowledge available about Netanyahu’s negative beliefs about Iran,  the implausibility of some of his assertions, their judgmental nature, as well as the disclosure of their incorrectness over time all support the idea that Netanyahu was insincere in his expression of fear from Iran in this particular case, and that he was constructing an existential threat about Iran in the midst of negotiations to reach a nuclear deal with Iran, which he vehemently opposed.

Abstract The geopolitical competition between India on one hand and the China-Pakistan axis, on the other hand, have made various researchers investigate the different, unknown, and influential aspects of this competition. One of the fields that can influence the analysis of these competitions is political geography. Therefore, in the present research, the researchers have tried to create a new point of view regarding Iran's position in the geopolitical competition between China and India by relying on the sources and analyses that have been done by Indian authors and researchers regarding the issue of China-India competition and also Iran's position in this competition. The authors of this research adopted a meta-analytic approach to drive conclusions from the collected data. Authentic documents in books, scientific-research articles, reliable internet websites and important international news agencies were analyzed to collect the relevant data. The findings suggest that regarding geopolitical access, both China and India are persistently seeking to facilitate their connection to Eurasia through Iran and Pakistan and thus increase their geopolitical weight to enjoy a better position in world politics in the 21^st century.

Abstract In many aspects, U.S. President Donald Trump’s approach to foreign policy-making was in sharp contrast with that of his predecessors, particularly post-WWII presidents. His hostility toward the long-lasting liberal international order that was crafted and maintained by former presidents, his eccentric ways of solving foreign policy issues, and his unusual rhetoric regarding U.S. allies and adversaries, are all indications of his “unorthodox” foreign policy approach. In an attempt to explain this unorthodoxy, in this article we aim to examine Trump’s cognitions and compare them to those of his post-WWII predecessors. In particular, we have measured the cognitive complexity score for each of these presidents to determine Trump’s position among them. In order to do so, we have calculated the Flesch-Kincaid readability score of the presidents’ verbal statements, assuming that the complexity of the statements indicates the complexity of their author’s thoughts. The results have clearly demonstrated that Trump was at the lowest level of cognitive complexity among the presidents under examination, and since a low level of cognitive complexity pertains to viewing the situation from limited perspectives, a low need for broader information, adhering to a limited number of policy options, ignoring advice, and decisiveness, we may reasonably infer that his cognitive simplicity played an important role in the unorthodoxy of his foreign policy approach.

Abstract According to Iran's constitution, expanding relations with Africa has always been one of the strategic principles in the country’s foreign policy; all previous presidents have therefore sought to expand the country's relations with Africa. Rouhani, however, pursued a different policy in Africa. His arrival in the office marked a considerable shift in Iran’s foreign policy. Rouhani’s African policy, compared to his predecessors, presents a peculiar case, because rhetorically he highlighted the importance of improving relations with Africa, but in practice, he almost neglected Africa at least in terms of trade and official visits. In other words, in Rouhani’s presidency, Africa remained as a key principle in the IRI’s foreign policy but not as a strategic partner. This paper uses a qualitative content analysis for analysing Rouhani’s rhetorical positions on Africa. By adopting the constructivist theory of IR and the importance of policymaking theories, the paper also argues that due to the geopolitical importance of Africa, Iran’s relations with Africa, although insignificant, remained unchanged. In Rouhani’s time, however, relations declined significantly due to his Westward policy. In discussing this policy shift, the role of both structure and agency are important and emphasize the reactionary nature of Iran’s foreign policy.

Abstract This paper pays particular attention to three critical junctures in Iran’s contemporary history: The Russo-Persian wars of the 19th century, Iran’s occupation by the Allies in 1941, and the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s. Combining a constructivist approach to geopolitics with the theory of Social Reality Construction, this article argues that these series of wars in the past two centuries have created an intersubjectivity, making Iranians feel “lonely” when the very survival of their state was at the stake. While Iran’s geographical situation has brought the country to the core of the great powers’ attention, repeated foreign invasions or interventions seem to have reproduced a sense of vulnerability for the Iranians. This paper is constructed around the following question: Is there something embedded in Iran’s geography that betrays this land’s sovereignty and imposes loneliness? The conclusion is that there is no natural or geographical reason to justify Iran's loneliness in the international arena, but rather, a perceptual construct reproduced by the historical context of events. The imposition of great political powers to contain Iran in its geography and to make it a buffer zone constitute a spatial reality; however, the feeling of loneliness derives from the social construction of reality.

Abstract The anti-American inclination of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s foreign policy-making is well established, and the bitter aspects of the two nation’s history well known. However, to assert a simple causal relationship between history and foreign-policy structure portrays the Islamic Republic’s anti-Americanism as inevitable, eternal and unrelated to actors’ agency. This article disputes this simple structural understanding by drawing on Greener’s method of applying path-dependency theory to political science. We first identify the ideas and structure of revolutionary Iran, benefiting in particular from the complementary insights of postcolonial theory. Following, we examine US policy choices in the Islamic Republic’s formative period of 1978–79—specifically those related to human rights, the shah and direct US intervention—and how these were perceived and acted upon in Tehran. Our findings indicate that American actions and Iranian decisions both influenced the establishment of a path-dependent process of perception and perpetration that continues until today. Successive Iranian governments have asserted that America ignores Iranian’s human rights, supports their enemies, and pursues direct intervention, while successive US government actions, motivated by Iranian counter-actions, have generated ample evidence to validate such claims. This can explain how a spiral of distrust emerged between the two nations.