Securitization of Iran's Nuclear Program During Obama’s First Administration

Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

1 Associate Professor of Transregional and Global Studies, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran

2 MA in North American Studies, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran

10.22059/wsps.2026.410273.1573
Abstract
Barack Obama entered office promising engagement with Tehran; by the end of his first term, his administration had assembled an exceptionally broad multilateral sanctions regime. This article explains that reversal and uses the case of Iran’s nuclear program to extend the Copenhagen School's theory of securitization in two ways. First, it treats sanctions and institutional measures not just as consequences of a completed securitization but as part of the securitizing process itself: UN Security Council Resolution 1929, the IAEA's 2011 report on possible military dimensions, and the 2012 oil embargo each reset the discursive ground and enabled the next move, so discourse and material action co-produced one another. Second, it theorizes the target state's responses as a structural enabling condition of securitization rather than a factor external to it. Using explanatory-outcome process tracing, the analysis follows the campaign through four stages - discursive entrapment (2009), institutional coalescence around Resolution 1929 (2010), scientific validation through the IAEA (2011), and the normalization of sanctions (2012) - and identifies the United States and its allies as the securitizing actors. Iran's legalism, its missed diplomatic openings, and the timing of its enrichment disclosures emerge as conditions that facilitated the campaign without being its cause.

Keywords

Subjects


Articles in Press, Accepted Manuscript
Available Online from 11 June 2026

  • Receive Date 30 January 2026
  • Revise Date 08 March 2026
  • Accept Date 11 April 2026