Document Type : Research Paper
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Abstract
Israel's foreign policy at times diverges from realist expectations based on rationality, proportionality, and prudence. This article argues that Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon exemplifies such divergence, driven by what Ernst Cassirer terms "mythical thought," or a myth-based discourse that constitutes the mindset of Israeli policymakers. Within this discourse, quantity and quality acquire specific characteristics, resulting in maximalist goals, voluntarism, reactive strategies, and disproportionate actions in foreign policy. Initially, Israel’s stated aim was a limited security operation; however, influenced by myth-based discourse, the mission expanded dramatically, seeking the elimination of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the expulsion of Syrian forces, and the establishment of a pro-Israeli government in Lebanon—goals far exceeding Israel’s strategic capabilities. Ultimately, encountering international structural constraints forced Israel to retreat and recalibrate its objectives temporarily. Employing discourse analysis of statements and texts produced by Israeli decision-makers during this war, the article illustrates how mythical thinking enabled unrealistic and expansionist elements to shape Israel’s foreign policy.
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