Journal of World Sociopolitical Studies

Abstract Israel's foreign policy at times diverges from realist expectations based on rationality, proportionality, and prudence. This article argues that Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon exemplifies such divergence, driven by what Ernst Cassirer terms "mythical thought," or a myth-based discourse that constitutes the mindset of Israeli policymakers. Within this discourse, quantity and quality acquire specific characteristics, resulting in maximalist goals, voluntarism, reactive strategies, and disproportionate actions in foreign policy. Initially, Israel’s stated aim was a limited security operation; however, influenced by myth-based discourse, the mission expanded dramatically, seeking the elimination of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the expulsion of Syrian forces, and the establishment of a pro-Israeli government in Lebanon—goals far exceeding Israel’s strategic capabilities. Ultimately, encountering international structural constraints forced Israel to retreat and recalibrate its objectives temporarily. Employing discourse analysis of statements and texts produced by Israeli decision-makers during this war, the article illustrates how mythical thinking enabled unrealistic and expansionist elements to shape Israel’s foreign policy.

Abstract Israel’s foreign policy at times diverges from prevailing realist expectations, specifically rational considerations and prudence. This article argues that this is the result of what Ernst Cassirer calls mythical thought or what can be called a myth-based discourse that constructs the mindset of policy makers and has made the emergence of non-realist elements in Israel’s foreign policy possible. In this discourse, quantity, quality, similarity, space, and time acquire specific characteristics and, in the field of foreign policy, this primarily leads to maximalist aspirations, volunteerism, reactiveness, lack of proportionality between capabilities and actions, and at times refraining from diplomatic engagements. However, we encounter a state's identity as a modern ruling state which, to gain international recognition and acceptability, must abide by the norms and laws that define statehood. On the other hand, we face an identity stemming from a mythical discourse, encompassing non-modern, irrational elements and self-definitions based on rules that often contradict legal discourse. Relying on discourse analysis, the texts produced by Israeli foreign policymakers are analyzed to show how this specific way of thinking has made non-realist elements in Israeli foreign policy possible.

Abstract In the post-2020 security environment of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, marked by the easing of Iranian-Saudi tensions, intra-Sunni reconciliation, the resolution of the Qatar blockade, and the signing of the Abraham Accords, the European Union (EU) sought to capitalize on the détente to advance its strategic interests. Compared to the other members of the so-called Western camp, the EU, which appears particularly vulnerable to its neighbouring region's instability, responded poorly to the emerging challenges and opportunities. Which factors explain the inefficiency of the EU to benefit from a permissive strategic environment and become more impactful in its broader neighbourhood? This article attempts to promote our understanding of EU’s foreign policy towards the MENA region through a Neoclassical Realist theoretical approach. Structural changes alone cannot explain the EU's failure to have a more prominent role in the region. Intervening variables, such as the role of institutions, state-society relations, and strategic culture, can shed light on the lack of policy cohesiveness and the overall inability of the EU to promote its influence abroad.  

Abstract Transition in the Middle East has been one of the most visible characteristics of the Middle East since the end of the Cold War. Having been probably the most penetrated region of the world, the international and the regional orders have always been closely, although mostly asymmetrically related. Thus, the transition in the international arena has been deeply impacting the regional scene, which, along the development from the Cold War through the unipolar moment of the United States to the post-hegemonic/post-US, has resulted in a relatively more independent regional order in the making. The new Middle East is still in transition, with the US having become one among several external actors, old regional powers returning and new ones emerging. But this transition changes not only the actors shaping the new regional order, but also some of the underlying concepts thereof, e. g. that of the regional power.

The present paper aims at presenting one of the most ancient regional powers of the Middle East, Egypt, by analysing how the interplay of internal, regional and external developments and the re-identification of the Egyptian state (and society) contributed to its re-emergence as a regional power.

Abstract Considering that the greatest threat to Iran in the past 400 years has emerged from the geography of Iraq (from the time of the Ottoman rule and onwards), it must be noted that Iraq is one of Iran's most important neighbors. Therefore, continuous examination of the shaping factors in Iran-Iraq relations is crucial. Although the history of Iran-Iraq relations spans over a century, this article seeks to explore, utilizing a historical-comparative method and an analytical approach, the shaping factors of Iran-Iraq relations from 2003 to 2022. The argument presented in this article suggests that while Iran managed to expand its regional influence in the aftermath of the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime, and replaced the pattern of hostility and tension of the Ba'athist era with a pattern of interaction and cooperation, the element of cooperation and interaction in Iran-Iraq relations is gradually fading due to changes and developments at domestic, regional and international levels.

Abstract According to Iran's constitution, expanding relations with Africa has always been one of the strategic principles in the country’s foreign policy; all previous presidents have therefore sought to expand the country's relations with Africa. Rouhani, however, pursued a different policy in Africa. His arrival in the office marked a considerable shift in Iran’s foreign policy. Rouhani’s African policy, compared to his predecessors, presents a peculiar case, because rhetorically he highlighted the importance of improving relations with Africa, but in practice, he almost neglected Africa at least in terms of trade and official visits. In other words, in Rouhani’s presidency, Africa remained as a key principle in the IRI’s foreign policy but not as a strategic partner. This paper uses a qualitative content analysis for analysing Rouhani’s rhetorical positions on Africa. By adopting the constructivist theory of IR and the importance of policymaking theories, the paper also argues that due to the geopolitical importance of Africa, Iran’s relations with Africa, although insignificant, remained unchanged. In Rouhani’s time, however, relations declined significantly due to his Westward policy. In discussing this policy shift, the role of both structure and agency are important and emphasize the reactionary nature of Iran’s foreign policy.

Abstract The anti-American inclination of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s foreign policy-making is well established, and the bitter aspects of the two nation’s history well known. However, to assert a simple causal relationship between history and foreign-policy structure portrays the Islamic Republic’s anti-Americanism as inevitable, eternal and unrelated to actors’ agency. This article disputes this simple structural understanding by drawing on Greener’s method of applying path-dependency theory to political science. We first identify the ideas and structure of revolutionary Iran, benefiting in particular from the complementary insights of postcolonial theory. Following, we examine US policy choices in the Islamic Republic’s formative period of 1978–79—specifically those related to human rights, the shah and direct US intervention—and how these were perceived and acted upon in Tehran. Our findings indicate that American actions and Iranian decisions both influenced the establishment of a path-dependent process of perception and perpetration that continues until today. Successive Iranian governments have asserted that America ignores Iranian’s human rights, supports their enemies, and pursues direct intervention, while successive US government actions, motivated by Iranian counter-actions, have generated ample evidence to validate such claims. This can explain how a spiral of distrust emerged between the two nations.

Abstract The primary concern of this research is to reassess the British foreign policy, focusing on its military withdrawal in 1971 from the Persian Gulf and its return in 2014. The Persian Gulf, as a region of geo-strategic importance, has always
been at the center of attention for the UK and other great world powers. This study will therefore attempt to answer the following question: what are the realities behind the British retreat from the Persian Gulf in 1971, and its return to
the region after 43 years? Britain, which has a significant history of military presence in the Persian Gulf, decided to keep a low profile in the Arab hosting countries since 1971. The UK has been working to manage interstate conflicts
among Arab-speaking countries, deter Iran, and maintain its ‘special relationship’ with the U.S. In terms of the theoretical framework of the study, realist theory will be used by focusing on the defensive and offensive realism as the instrument of analysis. Britain’s military withdrawal from the Persian Gulf can be analyzed through defensive realism, whereas its military return to the region could be explained by offensive realism. The case study method has been helpful in arriving at the conclusion that the main motivation for the British military presence in the Persian Gulf has been to strengthen an alliance with the Gulf’s periphery Arab States.

Abstract Political culture represents a society`s widely held, traditional values and its fundamental practices; foreign policy decision makers tend to make policies that are compatible with their society`s political culture because they share, if not all, many of those values. Among the various factors influencing Iran`s foreign policy, the role of political culture seems to be rather underestimated. This article seeks to analyze the role of Iran`s political culture in shaping the country’s foreign policy, through a comparative study of the hardline foreign policy of former president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and the moderate foreign policy of current president Hasan Rouhani. Accordingly, this paper`s main question is the following: What is the role of political culture in the change in Iran`s foreign policy during Ahmadinejad and Rouhani’s presidencies? Our main hypothesis is that the oscillation of Iran`s foreign policy between aggressiveness and moderation reflects Iran`s two simultaneous contradictory political cultures. In this theoretical-analytical paper, we apply a descriptive-explanatory method to examine our hypothesis. First, we will have a very short discussion of the various factors shaping Iran`s foreign policy. In the second section, we will shed light on the main elements of Iran`s political culture, which seem to influence the country’s foreign policy. The third section of this article will compare Iran’s foreign policy during President Ahmadinejad and President Rouhani; we will try to demonstrate how Iranian leaders who are stuck in Iran`s contradictory political cultures, have reacted and why. Finally, the impact of Iran`s political culture on its foreign policy change will be analyzed.

Abstract The foreign policy of states determines the way they behave in the international arena. Accurate analysis of official foreign policy documents of a country is helpful in that it shows what the international priorities of a country are at specific periods. This article reviews the U.S. National Security Strategy documents published in 2002, 2006, 2010 and 2015 from the perspective of the perception of threats to the U.S. security and perception of the U.S. role in the world. It tries to study the differences and similarities between the Bush and Obama administrations in this regard using a Neoclassical Realist framework. The results show that the Obama administration identified a wider range of threat sources to U.S. national security while providing less detailed solutions to them. Also, as democracy promotion abroad ceased to be a priority in 2015, compared to 2002 and 2006, counterterrorism continues to be at the top of U.S. security agenda. In line with Neoclassical Realism, creation of an international order under U.S. leadership is an important priority mentioned in the NSS of 2015.