Journal of World Sociopolitical Studies

Abstract Objective: The article examines the representation of the political rival in conflicts on Persian X, asking when such representation moves beyond disagreement over positions and ordinary boundary-making. The analysis centers on the relationship that the text constructs with the political rival. Three cases are examined: Iran’s 2024 presidential runoff (1403 SH), the dispute over the enforcement of the Chastity and Hijab Law, and whether Iran should negotiate with the United States.
Method: The research design is qualitative, text-centered, and processual-comparative, with the interactional-discursive cluster serving as the main unit of assessment. This version relies only on evidence clearly traceable in the attached data file and correspondence table; the core argument rests on six explicit and auditable evidentiary packages.
Results: The three cases differ in more than the intensity of conflict. In the election case, the relationship with the rival hardens mainly through appeals to legitimacy and belonging. In the hijab case, the dominant pattern takes shape through moralization of conflict and judgments about coercion, humiliation, and harm to everyday life. In the negotiation case, the evidence is more dispersed and supported only by a limited evidentiary segment in which strategic suspicion approaches the moral framing of compromise and surrender. In none of the three cases is the evidence sufficient to establish political hatred as the dominant logic. Understanding online conflict therefore requires distinguishing between the intensification of language and the transformation of the relationship constructed with the rival; in the documented data, this distinction is more defensible at the cluster level than through single-post reading.

Abstract In Afghanistan, theology forms a crucial component of the nation's cultural and societal identity, having been influenced by various political and social changes. This review article investigates the historical progression and present-day status of theology in Afghanistan, emphasizing pivotal historical periods such as the communist era, the Mujahideen governance, the Taliban governance, and the era of the Republic. It scrutinizes attempts to reconcile religious traditions with educational modernization, employing a qualitative-historical methodology. The research seeks to comprehend the shifts in theology and suggests recommendations to harmonize it with modern societal requirements. Despite the scarcity of literature, this study establishes a foundation for understanding the ways in which theology impacts Afghanistan's educational policies. By examining the evolution from 1973 to 2021, it underscores how political, social, and ideological factors have molded the substance and approaches of theology, thereby shaping Afghanistan's national identity and cultural growth. Significant fluctuations can be observed in the position, content, and teaching methods, as well as the application of theology during this period, which have directly influenced the national identity, as well as the social, and cultural development of Afghanistan. Religion and theology have been perceived as tools for gaining and maintaining power or as obstacles to the influence of power for the governments of Afghanistan over the past fifty years.

Abstract This paper investigates the intricacies of crafting historical narratives within secondary school textbooks in Afghanistan throughout the past century. Employing critical discourse analysis, the study scrutinizes five compelling examples illuminating the complex interplay between historiography, political ideologies, and artistic subjectivity in shaping students’ conception of national identity. The first case centers on the invention of fictional historical figures like Amir Kror that link Afghan lineage to powerful dynasties, but lack scholarly rigor and threaten social cohesion. Second, the analysis explores identity distortions woven into textbook images that portray figures like Genghis Khan with distinctly Afghan features, blurring historical accuracy. Third, it highlights methodological limitations and potential regional biases that cloud academic debates on the origins of dynasties like the Kartids. Fourth, the construction of demographic averages regarding ethnicity and religion without empirical basis raises concerns about perpetuating damaging stereotypes. Finally, the ubiquitous name “Afghanistan” itself reveals imbalanced emphases on particular eras, shaping modern conceptions of nationhood. Collectively, these five examples underscore the need for responsible scholarship and factual precision in history education to foster authentic engagement with Afghanistan’s rich and diverse heritage. As the curriculum shapes students’ notions of identity and selfhood, commitment to academic accountability and balanced historiography becomes essential to nurturing inclusive discourse and national cohesion.

Abstract After the fall of the republic in Afghanistan and the raising of the Taliban flag on the presidential palace, many thought that Afghanistan would GO back in time and return to the years before 2001. There WERE serious concerns about endangering the rights of women, the rights of ethnic-religious minorities, as well as the reappearance of foreign terrorist groups, especially Al-Qaeda, in Afghanistan. Considering these elements, many researchers question whether the Taliban has changed its principles, and whether or not the world is facing neo-Talibans. This study aimed to analyze the intellectual tradition of the Taliban with the framework of Laclau and Mouffe's theory, along with discourse methodology. The research examines the central signifiers of the Taliban discourse and their effect on the right of women, ethnic-religious, and foreign terrorist groups. The results indicate that the intellectual tradition of the Taliban is influenced by the powerful Pashtun culture of the governorate, which follows the three principles of honor, superiority, and hospitality, and affects the right of women, ethnic-religious, and foreign terrorist groups, along with the teachings of the Deobandy school.

Abstract By withdrawing from Afghanistan, the Soviet Union collapsed and the Cold War ended in the 1990s. Throughout that decade, western governments forgot the people of Afghanistan. But the 1998 attack on the US interests in Africa and al-Qaeda attacks of the September 11, 2001 reintroduced foreign aggression of the Western governments’ coalition against Afghanistan. Late in 2001, NATO countries, led by the United States, brought down the Taliban regime. Concomitantly, the UN conducted a conference in Bonn, Germany, in which political and paramilitary groups agreed to form an inclusive government without presence of Taliban. The Bonn Agreement contents show that most of its principles are based on the doctrine of Liberal Democracy. Accordingly, liberal democracy is reflected in most of the ratified articles of the eighth constitution of Afghanistan and it was expected to be effective in a country where many political regimes and systems had been experienced. However, it faced  challenges and nation-state building development process witnessed deficiencies. The present paper uses systemic analysis of the liberal nation-state (system input, policy design, policy implementation, evaluation and outcome) to answer the research question. The question is: how have the nation-state building process and political development in Afghanistan been affected by the Bonn Agreement and liberal democracy doctrine? And how has that led to the deficiencies in nation-state building and political development in the country? Hypothetically, the process suffered from deficiencies due to the following reasons: disregarding the historical-traditional contexts of Afghanistan, weak presence of liberal democrats in power, disregard for the demands of the fragmented society, the continuation of nationalist policies, and the incorrect public-private divide in the liberal structure of democracy.