University of Tehran Published jointly with Iranian World Studies Association Journal of World Sociopolitical Studies 2588-3119 Articles in Press 2025 11 08 Mythical Thought and Israel's Foreign Policy: the 1982 Lebanon War 104539 10.22059/wsps.2025.395552.1516 EN Sajad Minadi no affiliation Journal Article 2025 05 18 Israel's foreign policy at times diverges from realist expectations based on rationality, proportionality, and prudence. This article argues that Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon exemplifies such divergence, driven by what Ernst Cassirer terms "mythical thought," or a myth-based discourse that constitutes the mindset of Israeli policymakers. Within this discourse, quantity and quality acquire specific characteristics, resulting in maximalist goals, voluntarism, reactive strategies, and disproportionate actions in foreign policy. Initially, Israel’s stated aim was a limited security operation; however, influenced by myth-based discourse, the mission expanded dramatically, seeking the elimination of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the expulsion of Syrian forces, and the establishment of a pro-Israeli government in Lebanon—goals far exceeding Israel’s strategic capabilities. Ultimately, encountering international structural constraints forced Israel to retreat and recalibrate its objectives temporarily. Employing discourse analysis of statements and texts produced by Israeli decision-makers during this war, the article illustrates how mythical thinking enabled unrealistic and expansionist elements to shape Israel’s foreign policy.