Journal of World Sociopolitical Studies

Abstract Saudi foreign policy was mostly affected by its strategic relations with the United States as its primary and sole security provider. However, since the rise of Mohammed Bin Salman, Saudi Arabia further developed its relations with permanent non-Western members of the United Nations Security Council, respectively China and Russia. This study mainly contends that this transformation took place through strategic hedging, with regional and global consequences. It is contended that Saudi Arabia has adopted a triangular foreign policy through hedging, in order to balance its foreign relations with America and achieve regional supremacy. In this article, through a thematic analysis, we will investigate the ways in which Saudi foreign policy adopted hedging, the reasons for this action, and the motifs behind this decision. Saudi Arabia has tried to pursue national interests through hedging. This attempt is affected by a post-Cold War environment, preparing for a possible multi-polarization of the international system. Saudi Arabia also tries to improve its image alongside this approach in foreign policy. Correspondingly, this diversification of Saudi foreign policy is noticeably compatible with its domestic policy of opening up and adopting rapid modernization, which is analyzed through hedging and Neoclassical Realism.

Abstract Iran and Saudi Arabia have long been engaged in heated rivalry and conflict in the Middle East. These two regional powers are both major oil-exporting countries; in major foreign policy issues, therefore, oil is used as an important
tool to pursue goals. Iran and Saudi Arabia have a long history of differences on oil policies, but one of the most severe differences emerged in 2011-2016, along with escalating tensions between the two countries in the region, which heavily
shaped oil market trends in this period. In an attempt to analyze these oil market trends, the main question addressed in this article concerns Saudi Arabia’s decisions to use oil as a weapon against Iran in 2011-2016. The article reveals that the perception of expanding Iranian influence in the Middle East drove Saudis to resort to oil as weapon against Iran in 2011-2016. However, restrictions on the use of this tool led Saudi Arabia to withdraw from most part of this policy, especially in the oil market. The article uses neoclassical realism approach and illustrates Saudis’ direct and indirect use of oil weapon against Iran, and analyzes the outcomes of this offensive oil policy for the two countries in particular, and for the international oil market in general.

Abstract A decade after the establishment of the Saudi regime Riyadh and Washington constructed a strategic alliance between themselves in 1945. On the other hand, given the “Pivot to Asia” doctrine adopted by the Obama and Trump Administrations, the decline of Washington's dependence on Saudi oil, as well as some important events such as the murdering of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi by Riyadh officials, the prospect of relations between the two
countries has been highlighted in political circles. Based on a scenarioplanning study, the current paper tries to answer the question: “what will happen to the future of US-Saudi relations considering the aftermath of the Khashoggi murder?” Concerning the impact of this fiasco on the future of US-Saudi relations, we can logically consider five scenarios: the continuation of the status quo, the deepening of strategic relations, the decline of strategic relations, a strategic shift, and, finally, the elimination of strategic relations. But given ongoing circumstances, the deepening or end of strategic relations is unlikely to happen, the present article only focuses on the three other scenarios; the continuation of the status quo, the power shift and the decline of strategic relations amidst the two countries. However, the removal of Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) from the position of crown prince (should it be low-cost) could also be in Washington's agenda for maintaining strategic ties between the two countries. The paper's hypothesis is inclined to the status quo scenario and argues that with the official stances of the Trump Administration, in particular that of November 20, 2018, the strategic alliance of Riyadh-Washington will continue, with more expenses shouldered from the Riyadh side.

Abstract This study aims at comparing the economic relations of Japan with Iran and with Saudi Arabia. The comparison of these two relations is important as Iran and Saudi Arabia are leading exporters and Japan is a large importer of crude oil in the world. After a brief overview of the history of these two relations, the criteria of trade complementarity, i.e. Trade Potential Naive Assessment, Cosine Measure and Drysdale's Index are taken into account. Further, FDI in Iran and Saudi Arabia are studied based on the indicators of FDI value, FDI contribution to GDP, and the International FDI Performance Index. These indices indicate that in spite of the long aged Japan-Iran economic relations, these relations have been reduced in recent years both in trade and in foreign investment. Since, Japan needs to maintain dynamic and sustainable relations with its two main energy-providing countries; it has recently made direct investments in oil and gas extraction in Saudi Arabia in return for purchasing oil from this country. Comparatively, considering the high trading capacity between Iran and Japan, it would be time for the two countries to negotiate on the export of crude oil to Japan in return for expanding economic ties in joint ventures such as co-participating in the construction of extraction platforms and refineries in Iran, as well as gas stations in Japan and selling petroleum products on the Japanese (and East Asia) market.