Journal of World Sociopolitical Studies

Abstract Russia’s invasion of Ukraine involved a combination of hard and soft power measures, with geopolitical representations strategically employed to justify violations of international law. Despite their significance for understanding Russia’s regional actions, academic literature has mainly underexplored geopolitical representations. This paper aims to address this gap and answer to the following questions: (1) how did Russia use geopolitical narrations to justify the war against Ukraine, and (2) why did Russian geopolitical representations fail to achieve the aims? The research hypothesis is that 'the purpose of geopolitical narratives of perceived threats from Ukraine was to receive internal support and legitimize the war form the point of view of International Laws'. The research findings suggest that Russia’s initial military intervention was primarily based on a geopolitical narrative portraying Ukraine as an immediate threat through the alleged presence of Nazis, which served as a pretext to justify military action. In reality, this narrative was also used to retain Ukraine as a buffer zone against NATO expansion. This paper examines how geopolitical representations have influenced Russia’s foreign policy and its implications for regional security, and shows how they have been used to justify and sustain Russia’s military actions against Ukraine.

Abstract This study examines Russia’s strategic culture in West Asia and its implications for bilateral relations with Iran from the post-Soviet period (1991) to recent developments in 2025. Employing a qualitative framework rooted in strategic culture analysis, the research demonstrates that Russia’s approach toward Iran is shaped by pragmatic opportunism, historical experience, and a desire to maintain regional influence without overcommitting militarily. Findings reveal that Moscow engages with Tehran episodically, balancing cooperation against shared threats with strategic caution to preserve flexibility in relations with other regional actors, including Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. Brief episodes such as the U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities, the Syrian crisis, and the ongoing war in Ukraine illustrate how Russia mediates, condemns actions diplomatically, and selectively coordinates with Iran without offering binding security guarantees. The study identifies a persistent divergence in perceptions: Russia often views Iran as a secondary, conditional partner, whereas Tehran expects collaboration on an equal footing. Despite these differences, mutual interests in regional stability, energy cooperation, and strategic depth create occasions for tactical alignment, particularly under external pressures. Overall, the results demonstrate that the Russia–Iran relationship is conditional, adaptive, and strategically ambiguous, with cooperation shaped less by ideological convergence and more by pragmatic calculations. By situating these interactions within the framework of strategic culture, the study provides a nuanced understanding of the limits and possibilities of Russia–Iran engagement in West Asia, highlighting how historical legacies, geopolitical constraints, and contemporary crises collectively define a partnership that is influential yet inherently fragile.

Abstract The Russia-Ukraine war has ignited a complex geopolitical landscape with far-reaching implications. Global trade disruptions, economic strain, and heightened geopolitical tensions are only few of the consequences. This crisis serves as a microcosm of broader power struggles, influenced by historical, regional, and resource-based factors. Iran, although geographically distant from the conflict, is deeply intertwined in this complex web due to overlapping geopolitical interests. Ukraine's strategic position as a grain exporter, coupled with the broader context of NATO expansion and Russia's regional dominance, have placed Iran in a pivotal position. A central question emerges: What type of geopolitical pattern does Iran exhibit in response to the Ukraine crisis? Is it interactive, confrontational, dominance-seeking, influence-oriented, or competitive? To answer this, we will examine Iran's behavior across the various dimensions of geopolitics: geoeconomics, geoculture, geostrategy, and politics. By understanding Iran's approach, we can better assess potential opportunities and risks stemming from this crisis. Grounded theory approach was used for qualitative analysis, focusing on patterns and themes. MaxQDA software was used to analyze data and extract key concepts. Authors conclude that Iran-Ukraine geopolitical relations pattern are confrontational in all three dimensions: geostrategy, geoculture, and geoeconomics.

Abstract Constructivism theory believes that the power, security and survival of a nation are often shaped by the identity structures and perceptions of its agents, which in turn define the threats and opportunities that it faces. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia suffered an identity crisis and tried to regain its position as a "great power" by adopting the Eurasian identity model. The background of the research showed that realist, geopolitical and traditional investigations cannot correctly and fully explain the way in which the Eurasian identity was formed and its impact on Russia's military actions in Ukraine. As a result, this study tries to answer the question of how Russian identity and perception-based motivations in Russia's attack on Ukraine can be understood through constructivism theory. The main hypothesis is that constructivism provides insights into the main reasons for Russia's military invasion of Ukraine, which can analyze certain factors in this war, which cannot be understood through traditional theories. The findings of this paper confirm that Russia's attack on Ukraine was aligned with its role as a Eurasian power and Putin's identity visions. This article uses a qualitative research method using field and library sources to analyze the hypothesis.

Abstract Saudi foreign policy was mostly affected by its strategic relations with the United States as its primary and sole security provider. However, since the rise of Mohammed Bin Salman, Saudi Arabia further developed its relations with permanent non-Western members of the United Nations Security Council, respectively China and Russia. This study mainly contends that this transformation took place through strategic hedging, with regional and global consequences. It is contended that Saudi Arabia has adopted a triangular foreign policy through hedging, in order to balance its foreign relations with America and achieve regional supremacy. In this article, through a thematic analysis, we will investigate the ways in which Saudi foreign policy adopted hedging, the reasons for this action, and the motifs behind this decision. Saudi Arabia has tried to pursue national interests through hedging. This attempt is affected by a post-Cold War environment, preparing for a possible multi-polarization of the international system. Saudi Arabia also tries to improve its image alongside this approach in foreign policy. Correspondingly, this diversification of Saudi foreign policy is noticeably compatible with its domestic policy of opening up and adopting rapid modernization, which is analyzed through hedging and Neoclassical Realism.

Abstract This paper is an attempt to reconsider the legacy of universalism of traditional empires from the perspective of systems theory. In the West, the system ideas were already present in ancient Greek/Roman philosophy and developed further since the Renaissance within the domain of natural sciences (anatomy, mechanics or astronomy), whereas they did not develop as much in social sciences and particularly in politics, which lacks a holistic understanding. In the universal empires of the East (such as Iran, China and Russia) the system paradigm developed from the political life of centralized statehood. The core concept of the traditional imperial universalism was a particular understanding of “justice”, not as equality or absence of coercion, but as a certain form of social order. As the Chinese philosopher Xunzi and the Persian philosopher Nasir al-Din al-Tusi, noted, “justice” is primarily an “equilibrium”, that is a way of maintaining optimal interrelationships between different aspects of society within a single political whole. Traditional imperial universalism understood “just order” as a centralized hierarchical order. However, the current state of the systems approach and the complexity theory allows the reconsideration of the legacy of traditional universalism as the principle of totality of organizational connections and hierarchies of “systemic elements”, in the terminology of Russian philosopher, Alexander Bogdanov. It is concluded that the three Eastern thinkers share similar systematic understanding of “justice” as a hierarchically-arranged political order, coordinated on the basis of a single plan, which permits to maintain a dynamic balance.

Abstract When the war broke out in Ukraine, this eastern European country started a successful resistance that pinned down the Russian army in many regions and created a stalemate that has sparked a war of attrition not only in Ukraine, but also on social media territories in other political spheres. This study investigates the way in which Ukraine war is represented -or to be more precise, fought- in the Iranian X. Data mining methods were employed to search, find and extract posts including “Ukraine war” -or “جنگ اوکراین” in Persian. Our main question was, how did Iranian X users position themselves with regard to war in Ukraine? Using Python, a popular social media research tools, 2027 relevant posts were extracted to show the way in which Iranian users position themselves with regard to Ukraine war. Results revealed that the two Iranian main political factions  -namely Reformists and Fundamentalists- see this war not as a war of other countries, but that of their own. The pro-Western Reformists favor the Ukrainian side of the war and the pro-Eastern Fundamentalists favor the Russian side of the war. They fight on social media as though the Ukrainian war is their own war.

Abstract Economic sanctions, involving trade restrictions imposed by one country or a group of countries against another, come in various forms, such as tariffs, trade barriers, and import/export restrictions. In recent times, Iran and Russia have become targets of diverse economic sanctions imposed by the Western Bloc. Given that both countries heavily rely on their energy sectors as the bedrock of their economies, this study focuses on assessing the impact of Western sanctions on Iran and Russia's energy industries. Employing the Futurology method (Scenario planning), the research examines the effects of Western sanctions on the energy sectors of Iran and Russia, and explores their respective responses to mitigate these adverse consequences. The findings highlight four potential scenarios for the future of the Iranian and Russian energy sectors, based on two megatrends of sanctions and geopolitical tensions. Among these scenarios, the "Ideal scenario" emerges as the most favorable outcome, while the "Austerity scenario" poses the greatest challenges. Despite the short-term efficacy of these strategies, the study underscores heightened long-term investment risks in both nations. Consequently, foreign investors' participation in the oil and gas sectors of Iran and Russia is expected to decline.

Abstract significance, as they have grappled with enduring economic and political sanctions imposed by Western powers. Over time, both Iran and Russia have confronted a series of sanctions targeting their economic and financial sectors. In response to the adverse effects of these sanctions, both nations have embraced a strategy of 'resistance.' Experts contend that financial and economic sanctions induce substantial shifts in a country's macroeconomic landscape, prompting the adoption of distinct policies and strategic orientations. Against this backdrop, this research undertakes a comprehensive examination and analysis of the discourses surrounding economic resistance and resilient economies in Iran and the Russian Federation, with a focus on elucidating their commonalities and disparities. The research methodology employed in this study is the SWOT analysis method. Findings reveal that both Iran and Russia, while contending with Western sanctions, have pursued the implementation of resilient economy and economic resistance strategies, respectively. Iran's resilient economy signifies a transition towards long-term economic resilience rooted in religious principles. Conversely, Russia's economic resistance constitutes a short-term response to sanctions driven by political considerations".

Abstract The main purpose of this research was to examine the key metrics of the Russian digital economy and influencing factors affecting the digital economy development in Russia during the period of 2010-2020. One-way ANOVA was conducted to compare the three indicators of e-government. Results from LSD statistics indicated that there was a significant difference between the telecommunications indexes and human capital. The correlation matrix of economic influencing factors in Russia in terms of ICT application revealed that there has been a balance between the various economic sectors. Results of the Kruskal–Wallis test demonstrated that there was a significant difference between Russian financial institutions in terms of cyber-attacks. Based on the refinery methods of factor analysis, Pearson's correlation coefficient, and multiple regression model, five variables GDP, GDP per capita, R&D expenditure, cyber security, and consumer price index were removed from the analysis, and the results showed that the human capital has a significant positive impact on the development of the digital economy in Russia. Despite the significant explanatory role of the human capital index, this study strongly recommended considering the other variables, both predictive and control variables, to explain the variance in the development of digital economy in Russia.

Abstract This paper is an empirical attempt to investigate bilateral trade flow between Iran and Russia. To this end, we used statistical analyses on macroeconomic series over the period of 1991-2017. Results revealed that there is a significant
statistical difference in terms of exports between Iran and Russia, and that there has always been a buyer-seller dialogue between the two countries. According to the Export-Import Similarities (EIS), Iran and Russia represented low potential
complementarity between the years 2001 and 2017, which indicated that there is more trade competitiveness rather than trade complementarities between the two countries. Results from the statistical tests of Friedman and Kruskal-W revealed
that the service sector has played an important role in creating value in Russia’s economy. In addition, there is a statistical significant difference with respect to Iran’s exports to Russia in terms of Iran and Russia’s sanctions and Russia’s membership to WTO. During the sanctions imposed by the West, when Russia and Iran’s GDP always decreases, they find each other as regional allies and try to strengthen their bilateral economic relationship. However, there is an obvious
lack of diversity in Russian and Iranian export supplies and the volume of bilateral trade between them is not expected to increase in the future. Russia and Iran have failed to establish adequate economic, technical and educational ties and there is no active economic diplomacy between them. As a result, developing a clear program for the promotion of bilateral trade is a strategic priority, which must be operationalized by politicians.

Abstract Considering Russia’s rich and vast oil resources, this country is one of the world’s greatest producers and exporters of this nonrenewable energy resource, and like other petrostates, receives a major part of its national income in this way. The dependence of Russia’s budget on oil has raised the significance of world oil price fluctuations for this country. Since 1970s, the global oil market has experienced numerous shocks, which have in turn, had significant effects on Russia’s economy. Therefore, the theoretical study of oil shocks and their historical impact on Russia’s economy, as well as the policies adopted by this country to reduce the effects of those shocks, is considered a practical issue for Iran’s oil-based economy. The outcomes of this research indicate the positive impact of historical oil shocks on Russia’s economic growth. The establishment of a stabilization fund in 2004 and its development into the Reserve Fund and the National Welfare Fund in 2010 are considered to be this country’s most important policy in reaction to oil price shocks.